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WHYARETHERE SO MANY DIVIDED SENATE DELEGATIONS?
ABSTRACT
The last three decadea have witneased a sharp increase in
the number of states with spilt Senate deiegetions, featuring two
senators of different parties. In addition, there is evidence
thatsenators of different parties do not cluster in the middle:
they are genuinely polarized. We propose a model which explains
this phenomenon. Our argument builds upon the fact that when a
Sonnte election is held, there is already a sitting senator. If
thu voters care about the policy position of their state
delegation in each election, they may favor the candidate of the
party which is not holding the othuraeat. We show that, in
ganeral: (1) a candidate benefits if the non-running senator is
of thu opposing parry; (2) the more extreme the position uf the
non-running senator, the more extreme may be the position of the
opposing party candidate. Our 'opposite party advantage'
hypothesis is tested on a sample iacluding every Senate race from
1946 to 1986. After controlling for other important factors,
such as incumbency advantage, coattails end economic conditions,
we find reasonably strong evidence of the 'opposite party
advantage.'
AlhertoAlesins Morris Fiorina




Until recently the study of Congressional elections has generally aeant
the study of HAnse elections. Rut researchers have nuw begun to focus their
attentIon on Senate electicns. This increased interest probably has multiple
sources. To some extent, the political importance of recent Senate elections
draws our attention to them. The Republicans were able to capture the Senate
in 1980 and hold it until 1986, and their Senate majority was an irpurtant
component of the legislative successes of the Reagan administration. Another
basis of renewed interest in Senate elections undoubtedly stems from their
contrast with House elections. While the Republicans held the Senate from
1981—87, the House has remained safely in Democratic hands for thirty—five
years. Contrary to the expectations of the Framers, the electoral
responsiveness of the contemporary Senate is higher than that of the House
(Alford and Hibbing, 1989mb). Specifically, the advantages of incumbency in
contemporary House elections are almost overwhelming, hut incumbent fortunes
vary greatly in Senate elections.2 And while qualified, well—funded
challengers are a rarity in House elections (Jacobson, 1990, ch.4); Senate
incumbents seldom enjoy the luxury of unknown, under—funded challengers.
Occupying a position somewhere between presidential and House elections,
Senate elections seem to incorporate some of the major features of each Like
presidential nominees, Senate candidates are highly visible and their
campaigns heavily reliant on the mass media. Like Representatives, Senators
attempt to exploit the value of their incumbency, but it does not appear to
count for as much among the electorate. Issues and ideology are thought to be
mote important ln Senate elections than in House elections. But while
sometimes Senate races appear to hinge on major national issues, at other
times, the most parochial issues are thought to make the difference.3 And,2
finally, one cannot ignore the importance of traditional partisanship despite
two deoedes of research on its weakening.4 Apparently analyses of Senate
elections must take into account the full range of variables that appear in
both presidential and House election studies.
While the new wave of research undoubtedly wll tell us a groat doal
about the specifics of Senate elections we should keep the larger picture in
mind. In particular, Senate elections show a number of interesting features
that pose explanatory challenges for the new research. In particular recent
reaeatch identifies two developments that appear to be both politically
consequential and theoretIcally puzzling. We will refer to these as the
"split state question," and the "polarization question."
The split state question reflects the increase in the number of states
that divide their two Senate seats between the patties (Figure 1) .Inrecent
years state teptesentation in the Senate has been split as often as not, a
situation that oontrasts with the earlier historical tacord. In sutveying
that record Brady, Brody and Ferejohn (1989, pp. 3—4) observe
there is a dramatic rise in the number of split states begicning
in the 1960s. Prior to 19i0 (1918 on) theta were only fiva
instances of mixed state representation tising abovs 30 percent
while since 1960 no Congress has less than 30 percent and since
1966 the parcentage has nevet bean lower than 40 percent and has
been as high as 54 percent.
Poole and Rosenthal (1984b) point out that in the late seventies and early











Yearpercent mixed, 25 percent Democratic, end 25 percent Republican, exactly what
cne would expect if every vcter came cc the polle end tossed a fair ccin tc
determine her Senete vcte. The facts are cbvicusly different, ac we are
challenged to show how individual behavior that is far from random generates
an aggregate outcome that is the epitome of randomness.5
The polarization question reflects the grear ideological differences
between Democratic and Republican Senators (Figure 2). Poole and Rosenthal
(l984b) demonstrate that the Senate parties are not middle—of—the road, ma—too
parties; rather, they offer clear choices. Given decades of theorizing —
informaland formal that purports to identify centrist tendencies in two—
party electoral competitions, the polarization of the Senate patties
challenges us to identify the mechanism or forces that underlie it.7
Upon first observing split ststes one naturally thinks of the decline of
parties literature. And perhaps party decline provides a sufficient
explanation for split delegations If large numbers
of voters are not strongly moored to the parties, end if recruitment processes
characteristicallygenerate and fund credible challengers in Senate races,
then "every race a toss—up" would appear to be the natural outcome.
Ourdifficulty wrh this argument arises when we view the split trend in
kflrionwitholgizarion, We would be more inclined to accept the
decline of parties explanation if all Senate candidates clustered around the
mid—point of the ideological spectrum. Then, wrh weak partisanship and
little to choose between on the issues, Senate rates would hinge on the
unpredictable distribution of attractive peraonalicfea, inspired campaign
commercials, ethics questions, local issues, and exogenous shocks. But the




































































































































































































































































 liberal and a conservative. And the evidence is that when each comes up for
re—election, the electorate has a clear choice.8 Of course, if Senate
candidates were always equally polarized on the issues, then we might expecr
the seine outcome that would occur if they all converged to the median. But
then the question arises: why are Senate candidates so polarized?
In reflecting on Senate polarization most political scientists cite some
version of the "two constituencies thesis" (Huntington, 1950; Fiorina, 1974;
Brady, Brody end Ferejohn, 1989). In each state there are opposed groups of
activists who monitor government and participete in campaigns and consequently
hare their preferences weighted more heavily than those of average voters.
Empirical research suggests that such people have more extreme views than
ordinary voters and are highly polarized. Thus, candidates are drawn away
from the median by their need to please the activists. When the Democrats win
the Senator is more liberal than the state, whereas when the Republicans win
the Senator is more conservatfve,
Likemost others we first viewed Senate polarization as indicative of the
two constituencies notion, But upon reflection the argument is clearly
insufficient. First, beginning with Downs (1957) three decades of theorizing
aboutelectoral processes in two—party systems has repeatedly found strong
centrist tendencies. When equilibria exist they are typically some
generalized median. tTnen equilibrfa do not exist, minmax sets (Kramer, 1977);
stochastic solutions (Ferejohn, Fiorina, and Fackel, 1980), uncovered sets
(Shepsle and Welngast, 1984), and all other known theoretical models of
competitive processes suggest centrist outcomes seemingly at variance with the
polarization findings of Poole and Rosenthal (l984b). gven when candidates
are policy—oriented there are strong incentives to converge (Calvert, 1985).More recently, however, Alesina (1988) showed that when votets learn candidate
ideology, the latter are not free to move in the policy space for credibility
reasons. In particular, extremists who sre known oe such, would not he
believed if they announced a moderate program. But although this recent work
explains why extremists may not be able to converge, we still need to explain
why centrist, moderate candidates do not enter and defeat relatively more
extreme competitors.
Some scholars also have tried to extend the two constituencies thesis to
explain the split trend (Brady, Brody, end Ferejohn, 1989). As with the
polarization question, we do not believe that the two constituencies thesis
can bear all of the explanatory weight, If one constituency is strong enough
to wn one election, why is it not strong enough to win the next one as well?
Surely, most state are not so closely divided that presidential coattails and
mid—term penalties are sufficient to swing each election, the former in favor
of one party, the latter in favor of the other. For the two constituencies
thesis to say anything about the increase in split states it must posit that
states are evenly divided politically, and additionally, identify some
consideration that systematically advantages first one constituency, then the
other.
We have identified such a consideration, one that contributes both to
split states and candidate polarization, Our argument builds on a key insight
that has not been taken account of in previous analyses:9 when a Senate
election is held, there is already a sitting Senator. If voters appreciate
that at any givsn time they are choosing the second member of a pair, rather
than making an unconditioned choice between two candidates, the nature of the
resulting electoral equilibrium is consistent with both the split state andthe polarization phenomena. Specifically, in equilibrium (1) acandidate
benefitsif the non—running Senator is of the opposing party; (2) the more
extreme the position of the non—running Senator, the more extreme may be the
position of the opposing party candidate. Thus victory by one party raises
the probability that the opposing party will win the next election, and an
extreme position by the non—running Senator permits an extreme position by the
contending candidate of the other party in the next election. Thus the model
rationalizes both splits and polarization. On first consideration this logic
will strike many readers as implausible. We ask them to suspend their
skepticism temporarily, for the empirical results to be reported are
consistent with the theoretical predictions. In the concluding discussion we
will return to the question of the model's a priori plausibility.
2. The Model
The electoral system chat produces United States senators is unusual.
From the standpoint of the individual senator it is a standard single—member
simple plurality system. But from the standpoint of the voter the electoral
system is multi—member. Unlike ocher multi—member systems, however, the
members are not in direct competition and are not elected at the seme time.
Now,might unusual electoral arrangements give rise to unusual voter behavior?
Specifically, while a voter may prefer that his Senate representation consist
of two Democrats, two Republicans, or one of each, the electoral arrangements
forthe Senate do not allow the expression of a choice among those three
altarnatives. Because one senator will not be running in any given election,
voters can express a preference only for two senators of the same party as the
non—running senator, or for one senator from each perty.0 The voter' ccs conditional upon the existence of the non—running senator. Thus it would
not be surprising if the voter took some account of that senator when making a
choice in the election for the other seat.
Specifically, we use a unidimensional spatial model to express how voters
care about the composition of the Senate delegation of their state. We
characterize voters' utility functions as follows:
—[n+a
— (1)
where n —policyposition chosen by the senator elected for the seat which is
voted upon; a —positionof the senator who is not up for election, which we
define as the 'anchor"; i —blisspoint of the generic voter i. The quadratic
specification is adopted only for algebraic simplicity; any single peaked
symmetric concave function could be used. Purely for expositional purposes,
we also assume that the distribution of voters' bliss points is uniform and
normalized in the [0,1) interval. Thus, the median voter has a bliss point j°
-1/2.
Equation (1) posits that the voters care about the "policy position" of
their state, which is the result of a linear combination of the positions of
the two senators. In (I) it is assumed that the two Senators weigh equally in
policymaking. Our analysis can, however, be generalized to the case in which
"senior" Senators have a higher weight (see below). Equation (1) also
embodies voter myopia, since it assumes that voters act as if they cared only
about the current election and do not take into account the implications of
the position of the current winner for the future. We conjecture that ourqualitative oonolusiona would not be altered by the explioit oonsidaration of
voters' foresight. Even though the voters would be less prone to support an
extreme oanddate solely for the immediate benefit of belanoing an extreme
anchor, substantial balaooing should still ooour, pertioularly if the future
is discounted. We also do not model how state level balancing in senate
eleotions interaot with balanoing at the national level (see Fiorina 1988,
Alesine and Rosenthal 1989a,b), although we oontrol for these effeots in our
empirioal work below.
The seat whioh is voted upon oan be won by either a Demooratio oandidata,
who adopts position "d" or by a Republican candidate, who adopts position
In order rc illustrate our basic argument in the simplest possible way, we
consider first the case in which all the candidate positions, i.e., d, r and a
are fixed and known by the voters. We also assume rd, that is, the
Democratic position is never on the right of the Republican position. With no
possibility of confusion we will sometimes refer to the Democratic party as d
and to the Republican party as r.
2.1. Fixed positions
It is immediate to show that voter i votes r if and only if (with no loss
of generality we assume that the indifferent voter votes r):
(d+r) ,]Ld+r+2a *
i. R + ç)a i (2)
That is, i is the ideal point of the indrferent voter. Joters on the left
of i vote d; voters on the right vote r. Several comments are in order.
i) If there were no anchor, the indifferent voter would be given by:9
1-. (3)
Notethat >if and only if
(4)
Condition (4) illustrates the basic idea of this paper. If the anchor s
totheleft of the midpoint between d and r, the right wing candidate (r) is
advantaged in the election with the anchor, relative to the case of no anchor,
since i <i.Similarly, if the anchor is right wing, the voters want to
"moderate him by favoring the left candidate.
An example of this result is the situation in which the anchor adopts
position d (ie. ,a—d<1/2<r).In this case we have:
i*_r+d<I (3)
Thus, a P.epubljcan candidate gains byrunning with a Democratic anchor.
Ce willrefer tothisresult as the opposite party advantage" hypothesis, and
will test itbelow,in the empirical partofthe paper.11
ii) Civen (2) and a fixed position ford,the moat right wing position
that r can adopt and at least tie the election, i.e. i —1/2,is given by
suchthat:10
r2 —d—2a (4)
Thus, the more left wing is a, the mote tight wing r ten he and at least
tie the election. This is due to the fact that the mote left wing is the
anchot, the mote moderation on the tight is desited by the votets. This
resultmey hint at a polarization trend" in a dynamic eetting. If tbecomes
more extreme, in the next election he will be the anchor, enabling the d
oanddete to be extreme and still win.If an extreme d becomes the anchor,
thenr can be mote extreme in the next round, end so on. Since we have not
developed a dynamic model, it is impossible to explicitly characterize this
adjustment through time; however, condition (6) suggests a possible basis of
increasing polarization.
Figure 3 illustrates out argtosents. In Figure (3a) we represent a
standard teo—candidate contest with no anchor. The policy space is the
intenal [0,11, the median voter is at 1/2, d —1/3and r2/3. In this case
-. d+t 1.. thernatfoetent voter is —y—— .Theelection is a tie. In rigute
(3b) we consider an election with the same positions for d and t, but with a
left wing anchor; that is, ad —I/I.In this case the indifferent voter
isi5/12 ms implied by (5). Thus voters with ideal points between 5/12
and 1/2 vote d in the election without the anchor, but vote r in the election
with the anchor; in the second case, candidate r wins the election. Figure
(3°) illustrates that given a —d—1/3,the moat tight wing position that m
can take and still tie is given by r —1.Thus, for these parameter values r
can be as tight wing as the moat extreme position in the policy space and
still at least tie. Remember that without the left wing anchor, r would lose
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Finally, it should be noted that out framework is not inoonsistent with
the oase in which two Senators of the same patty ate elected. This
possibility is illusttated in Figure 3d. Suppose that a d3/7 and
6/7. In this case i* 15/28 and d wins the eleorion. Clearly, two
Senatots of the same patty ate eletted when theit position is much oloser to
the median than that of the opponent. 12
Out results can be generalized to the tase in which the anchot and the
new Senator weigh differently in polity fotmulation. Suppose, again that the
anthor is 1eft wing (i.e., to the left of the median votet and to
the left of andmote influential in polity fotmulation than the new
Senator. Then, the t tandidate reoeives mote votes (fot given d, t and a) the
higher is the weight of the anchor in policymaking. In addition, for given d
and a the higher is the weight of the anchor, the mote right wing r oan be and
still win.
Differential weight in polity can be explained by multiple
considerations. Seniority is one: a more senior senator is likely to be mote
influential in policymaking than a freshman. Thus, if the anchor, who has
been in office for some time, is senior to the new Senator, he may be more
influential. Another consideration is "mandate." Ceteris paribus, an anohor
who had been elected with a landslide is likely to be more influential than if
he had barely won his seat in a highly contested race. In general, the
"opposite party advantage" end the "polarirarion trend" are stronger the lower
the weghr of the new senator. This is because more voters will turn to an
"extreme'S left (right) wing candidate in order to moderate a very powerful
right (left) wing anohor.312
3. Mobile Candidates
We now consider models in which the candidates can choose their
positions. We assume that candidates d and r have different preferences
(Wittman, 1977 1990; Calvert, 1935). The policy platforms chosen before an
election are "credible" in the sense that post—election policies cannot be
different from the pta—electoral platforms. (For a discussion of this
assumption see Alesina, 1938). There is uncertainty about the preferences of
the electorate,14 which can be captured by assuming that the extremes of the
uniform distribution of the voters' ideal policy are (w, i+w] where w is a
random variable with an expected value of zero, i.e., E(w) —0,and a
cumulative distribution F(w)1












Note that F is increasing in a and r; in particular, the more right wing
is the anchor the better the chances of the d candidate. The result
generalizes the "opposite party advantage" hypothesis, since it implies that
the probability that the d candidate wins is higher if the anchor is r than if
she is th Also note that,8Projins' j9bdwins
(8) Ba Br
't'ne probability that d wins is more sensitive to the anchors position then to
the other candidates position.
Let us now move to the choice of platforms. TWO possibilities may arise.
In the first, one of the two candidates is the incumbent chosen to be r. The
positions of both the anchor end of the incumbent are fixed and known to the
voters. That is, it is impossible for the incumbent to "move" in the policy
space since the voters know his ideology, to the contrary, the challenger is
free to move; thns we study the optimal choice of the position of the
challenger? d. The maccod possibility is that of an open seat competition.
In this situation, both oandidates are free to move in the policy space. We
analyre the incumbent case here; the open seat case is dicussed in the
Appendix.
When r is the incumbent, the choice of d depends upon the specification
of the objective function of the challenger. We have considered three cases:
in all three cur basic results of "cppcsite party advantage" hold, but some
interesting differences emerge. The three cases are as follows:
1) Candidate d cares about the position adopted in the campaign
being in office par se. Thus, his utility function is given by:
(dd)° + KS (9)14
whereC is the party bliss point; K >0is the utility of being in office and
& —1if and only if d is elected, and zero otherwise,
2) Candidate d cares about the position he adopts only if he wins; thus,
his utility function is:
—[-(d—d)2+ (10)
3) The candidate cares (as the voters) about the policy outcome and
about winning pet se. Thus, the challenger's objective function is given by:
C0 —— ( — 0)2+KS (11)
Case
Theproblem faced by party d is the following:
Max —(d —d)2+P(d,r,a)K (12)
d
In (12), P() is the probability that d wins, given in (7).
The first order condition is:
K -2(d-d) (13)
The left hand side represents the marginal benefit of convergence, since it is15
composed of the marginal gain in probability (remember that >0if
d C r) of a move to the right multiplfed by the utility of being in office.
The tight hand scue epresents the marginal cost of deviating from party d's
ideal policy d. The maximum is obtained at the point in which marginal costs
equal margfnel benefits.16
Several comments are in order:
i) In equilibrium a<d a r. If d ￿ d the right hand side of (13) is rero or
negative and the left hand side is positive. If d > r > atheright hand side
is posirve and the left hand side negative.




The sign of depends upon the generally ambiguous sign of the cross partial
derivative of P(S). Tf w is uniformly distributed, it immediately follows,
82() . . . . . from(7) that 0. Thus, in th:s case the position cnosen by d is
not affected by a. The intuition of this result is that the d candidate cares
about his own platform regardless of the position of the anchor except,
possibly, for the indirect effect of the cross partial derivative of the P()
function. This indirect effect is rero in the uniform case.16
iii) From (7) it follows that the total derivative of P() with respect to a
is given by:
dP() 11 3d —(+—)F(.) (it)
Therefore, >0if and only if >— 2,which implies [from (14))
32p!) 4 >— — Thus,under this condition, which is satisfied in the case of cd3a k
a uniform distribution of w, the more right wing is the anchor the more likely
it is that d %lins the election: this is the "opposite party advantage"
result
Case 2




The first order condition for this problem is given by:17
[K —(d_a)2]
—2P(.)[d-d[ (17)
As in (13), the right hand side of (17) represents the marginal cost of
converging; the loss in ideology is incurred only if elected, unlike in the
previous case. The left hand side is the marginal benefit of convergence,17
which is positive, since the term [K—(da)°] represents the total value of
being in office. Note that this term has to be positive in equilibtium;
othese the utility level fot patty d would be higher when out of office
then when in office. In other words the loss entailed by a candidate taking
a position other then his ideal point must not exceed the value of the office
As in case 1, n equilibrium we have A C d Sr.(The second inequality is
strict for K sufficenrly low.) Under mild suffcienr conditions, discussed
in the Appendix, whith imply that the cross partial derivative of P(") is not
3d toolarge, one can show that v- C0.That is, tne more right wing :s the
anchor, the more left wing is the position chosen by candidate d. As
emphasized above, the sufficient condition on the cross partial derivatives of
P()issatisfied in the case of the uniform disrriburion of w as well as by
more general distributions (see Appendix).
This last result hints at the possibility of the dynamic "polarization
trend" discussed above in the context of the fixed position model. Note that
this trend would be bounded by the ideal points of the two candidates. That
is, in equilibrium the positions of d and r would always be in the interior of
the interaal bounded by d and .T'nus,the "polarization trend" would nor be
explosive.
Finally, under mild sufficient conditions on the cross partial
derivatives of P() which are discussed in Appendix and are satisfied in the
uniform case, the "opposite parry advantage" holds in this case as well.
Namely we have:
÷ >0 (18) da Ba 3dBa18
The more right wing is the anchor, the more likely it is that, in equilibriwn,
the left candidate is elected, despite the fact that d moves to the left, in
response to a's right wing move. The intuition is that if the anchor is more
of an extreme right winger, d faces a better "trade—off" between his ideology
and his likelihood of victory. In general, d chooses to improve on both
"margins"; i.e., probability of victory g ideology. Thus, the "opposite
party advantage" holds: the d candidate has a better chance of victory when
the anchor is r than when the anchor is d.
Case 3
The maximization problem faced by candidate d in this case is as follows:
Max (d,r.a){[._{__ — + K] (19)
+[1—P(d.ra)){
-}2}
Define: d —2d—a (20)
Then problem (19) can be rewritten as follows:
Max P(d,r,a)( [(r—d)2 —(d-d)21+K} (21)Equation (21) shows that d acts as if his ideal policy were d in a
standardtwo candidate model. ThileI is more extreme than I, (d CIif I C
a)the d candidate acts as if the value of office is four times the value it
would have were there a straight two candidate race. Because d chooses his
policy knowing that the final policy outcome will be a weighted average of the
winner's and the anchor's positions d behaves as a more extreme candidate who
is nonetheless more Thlectoralistic" than he would be in a standard two
candidate election.
The first order condition of this problem is the following:
U +ElP(•) (d—d) (22)
where dU[(r—a)2 —(d—d)2J.
The left hand side is the marginal benefit of convergence. The marginal
increase in probability is multiplied by a utility term, which represents the
benefitof holding office plus the difference in the ideologies of the
parties. The mghr hand side is the marginal cost of convergence, which is
increasing in both the probability of winning and the difference between d and
the modified bliss point,
Several comparative statics results can be derived by applying the
implicit function theorem to (22). Derails of the derivations are given in
Appendix. Here we report the results without proof.
i) I<d￿r (23)
wrhthe last inequality strict for sufficiently low values of K.23
Note that it is possible that the following occurs in equilibrium:
d<d<d<r (24)
That is, unlike in the previous cases, candidate d may choose a position which
is even more left wing than his true ideal point. This is because the policy
outcome, which is what both the voters and candidate d care about, is a linear
combination of d's position and the anchor's position.
ii) Under mild sufficient conditions on parameter values (see Appendix)
we obtain:
(25)
That is, the more right wing is the anchor the more left wing is the position
chosen by the challenger cL The conditions needed on parameter values are
first that is close to rero; second, that in eqilibrium (r—d) is not
too high, which implies thac K has to be sufficiently high. The second
condition implies that the polariration effect captured by (25) holds as long
as d and r are not already too far apart. This result captures the
"polarization trend" in this model with a mobile challenger.19
iii) Under another mild sufficient condition on parameter values
(satisfied in the case of a uniform distribution of w) which is discussed in
the Appendix, the "opposite party advantage" holds in this case as well. That
is, it can be shown that condition (18) holds.21
This concludes our analysis of elections with en incumbent with fixed
position.To summatire in sevetal models based on diffetent assumptions
about candidates' motivation, degtee of mobility in the policy space and the
infotmetion about votets' prefetences, the basic opposite petty advantage"
result holds, Thus, the left (tight) wing candidate is advantaged in an
election when the senatot holding the othet seat is right (left) wing.
Futthermore, in some of the models thete is a tendency fot the left (tight)
wing challenger to adopt a mote extreme position the mote extreme is the tight
(left) wing position of the anchot.
4. Empitioal Results
Proponents of fotmal models traditionelly argue that one of the values of
their enterprise is the generation of nonobvious propositions that can be
subjected to empirical test. Confirmation of such propositions not only
supports the model that generates them, but also adds to knowledge by
identifying unexpected relationships that inductive modes of analysis
overlook. Our model generates two hypotheses that seem genuinely nonobvious:
I. Other things equal, rhe Oemocratic Senate
candidate is advantaged when the non—running Senator is a Republican, and
vice—versa.
2. ypgpecpgg,r extremes. Other things equal, the more extreme the
position of the non—running Senator the more extreme (in the opposite
direction) will be rhe position of the other party's candidate.22
The second hypothesis is contingent on the objective function assumed fot
the csndidstes: it holds in the second snd third cases enelyted above, but
not in the first.2° Moreover, testing the second hypothesis presumes accutate
rzeasucement of csndidate positions relative to those of the median votets in
their states.21 But the first hypothesis is robost under all three objective
iunctions considered, and requires no heroic fests of measurement. Thus, this
secticn reports on e series of tests designed to examine the opposite perry
advantage hypothesis. Cererie peribus, is it better for a Democrat
(Republican) to run for the Senate when the non—running Senator is e
Republican (Democrat)? Because the premise of the hypothesis is that parties
are on opposite sides of the median voter, sny test of the hypothesis —such
as the one that follows — thatdoes not solare a pure set of such elections
will be biased against the hyporhess because it mixes elections in which the
hypothesis should hold with others in which it should not,
We have compiled a date set consisting of all post—war (1946—19%) Senate
elections that saw two—party contests.22 Because we use previous election
results as right hand side variables in the analysis, the dependent variable
(Senate vote) begins in 1952. The equations included other variables
previously found to be important.23
• Senate incumbency—dummy variable
• Senate seniority —measuredboth as years of service end as log years
• presidential coattails —measuredby both the national presidential
vote end the state presidential vote (Campbell, 1990)
• economic conditions —measuredby the increase in real GM? during the
election year (Erikson, 1988; Fair, 1988; Chappel and Sumuki, 1989)2423
previous vote —laggedvote for the Senate seat in question (normally
six years previously, but oocasfonally more retent if a speoial
election were held)
time trend —introducedto account for any secular national
improvement in Republican senatorial fortunes
midterm effect —duessyvariable for control of the Presidency
[Erikson, lPfS; Alesina and Rosenthal (lSBSa,b)[.
We fully expected these variables to attount for the lion's share of the
variance in Senate elections over time. As it turned out, economic
conditions, fncumbency, lagged vote, and the midterm effect were important.Zt
The most interesttng question is whether the non—running Senator has any
effect over and above these variables.
Note that the correct econometric specification for representing the
anchor seat effect when testing the opposite party advantage hypothesis is not
a dummy variable for the party of the anchor, aa intuition might suggest. Let
us return to our simplest model, with fixed party positions and no
uncertainty.Assume that in every state, j,voters are uniformly distributed
on[0,1]and that the parties take positions d. r,j.(T'nere is no loss of
generalityhere other than uniformity, since the origin and length of the
space of some underlying national liberal—conservative continuum could vary
across states without changing our results.) Assume that the party positions
are sufficiently close to symmetric about the median (1/2) that all states
have split delegations. The inequalities that define this situation are




where Vi is the Republican vote percent, and is the Republican vote
percent in the preceding election for the anchor.
Thus, each state would have a different intercept, and the coefficient on the
anchor vote would be —1. In light of this argument it would not be correct to
estirate an equation of the form:
+
B11j
where I is a dummy variable for the party of the anchor seat, and
I —1,2 are coefficients.
In summary, then, the anchor vote is a proxy variable for the positions
of the two parties. Indirectly, the plurality of the anchor influences the
share of votes received by senators competing for the other seat.
Of course, there might be other States where party positions were such
that one party always wins both seats. This could happen, for example, if
both parties were to the same side of the median. For these states we would
have
Vrj —
Inthese states, regressing on either the anchor vote or an anchor dummy
variable would be inappropriate. If our actual sample includes a mixture of25
split delegations and unified delegation states and we regressed on the anchor
vote, our estimated regression coefficient would be less than 1.0, since it
would be an average of the 1.0 from the split states, and the 0,0 from the
unified states,
In real elections the relationship between the anchor position, the
anchor vote and the current vote will be more complex than that generated by
our simple model with a uniform distribution of preferences. It will depend
on factors fncluding (a) the distribution of voter preferences, (b) changes in
voter preferences between elections, (t) the objectives of the candidates,
(d) the relative weights of the anchot and contested seats. Consequently, the
functional form of the relationship in general can not be specified. We can
only ask whether past and current votes have a statistical relationship. As
is commonly the case in empirical work, a linear term worked best;
transformations, dummies, and interactions added little. Therefore, the
results we report are based on equations in which the anchor vote affects the
current vote in simple additive fashion.26
The firstcolumnof Table I contains a simple regression that accounts
forabout half the variance in postwam Senate elections, Tne estimates
suggest that
1. Running as an incumbent is worth about four points.
2.Runningin a mdterm election costs candidates of the president's
patty between 2and3 points. Thus, in the current period of
Republican presidential dominance, Republican senatorial candidates
are disadvantaged.26
3.Every one point increase in ONE growth during the election yeat is
worth ebout half a point for candidates of the presidentialparty -
4.There is a very small but significant Rapublican trend in post wet
Senate races.
5. There is quite a bit of slippage from one election to the next, as
the coefficient on the vote six years earlier is only about .25
6. The vote garnered by the non—running Senator two or four years
earlier is negatively related to the vote in the next election?
although the estimate is not significant.
The first four results are straightforward and in keeping with previous
findingsin the literacure. The fifth finding is mildly surprising but quite
in keeping with the image of Senate elentions as volatile and idiosynnratic.
The sixth finding is most intriguing: the opposite patty advantage hypothesis
meets with some weak support. With this bit of encouragement we pushed on.
In the second column of Table I the effents of the two previoum elections
havebeen estimated aeparately for elentions contested by incumbents and those
in which the Senate seat is open.27 Now an interesting disparityappears. In
incumbent—contested seats the vote in the election two years or four years
earlierbears a significant negative relationship rn the current vote (t—l.7.
p C.05,one—tailed test). Roughly, there is a 7 pnrnenr "tax" or penalty on
the parry'a previous vote margin. In open seat rarrs, no such penalty
appears. Instead, both the lagged vote and snchnr vote have similar positive
coefficienca.
In the third column of the table we take she next Ingical step, that of
dividing the effecra of previous elections arnsrciing to whether the election27
occurs 5.n a presidential or off—yearThis estimarion reveals rhat the
negativerelatiooship between the votes inadjaceot Senate elections is
strongestin presidential election years with incumbents ruooiog2 Roughly
speaking, in such elections for every vote a partys candidate got in the
previous Senate election, the party's current candidate loses one fifth of a
vote, a penalty of nearly 20percent.No negative relationship emerges in
mid—term years or in presidential years without incumbents running.29 A
reexamination of the model suggests a possible explanation for the
presidential year finding. Middle—of—the—road voters, those whose ideal
policy lies between those of the two parties, are those most lilcoly to engage
in "balancing" behavior (Figure 3). If presidential electorates contain more
such moderate voters than the smaller mid—term electorates, thon we would see
more evidence of balanong behavior in the former.
We wish to emphasime the importance of the results in Table 1. in any
pair of temporally adjacent elettions, zz).e1s.ofwhg.thg.nintumbeni.sare
senmelettion, researchers would expect to find a strong positive
relationship between a party's vote in one election and its vote in the next,
and one would expect the relationship to deteriorate as the elections become
more separated in time. To underscore this point consider the reletionship
between current election results end previous results in Mouse elections. In
Table 2 the Republican vote in 1976—fl—SO House elections is regressed on the
Republican vote one election and two elections earlier,30 As one would
expect, the returns in both earlier elections are positively related to those
in the current election, but those from the closer election have a much
stronger relationship than those from the more distant election. Although
this pattern is stronger for inoumbents, it is clearly true for open seats as28
well,except fct the anomolous insignificant negative coefficient fot the 1978
mid—term (based on only 34 observations). Thus, a House candidate's vote
bears a significaLs positive relationship to the vote for the (different)
candidate of his party in the previous election. In contrast, as Tahle I
shows, a Senate incumbent's vote has a significant negative relationship to
the vote for his party's (different) candidate in the previouselection, at
least in presidential election years. This is a herecofore unnoticed
empirical disparity.
In order to highlight even more clearly the surprising difference in the
lag structure of House and Senate elections, we have run for the Senate the
same regressions reported ic Table 2 for the House. The coefficient on the
first lag effectively zero, reversing the normal relationship foaggregate
election returna (Table 3).
Finally, we heve also rested whether voters seek to balanue with their
vote the overall composition of the Senare, rather than their state
delegation. To control for this different type of balancing we defined a
variable, Republican sear share in the Senere preceding the election under
consideration. This variable was added to our regression but was never
significant: the t—atariatic on irs coefficient never reached the value of I.
A theoretical account conaisrenc with this finding runs as follows. Voters
care both about national policy ourcoc.es and about how the Senators of their
statearticulate the state positionsThe focus of this paper, balancing or
the state level, is relevant for the definition of the state position.
National policy outcomes, in contrast, are affected by the interaction between
the House, the Senate and the President. Ar the national level, the releveur
balancing involves an executive—legislative Interaction which is captured by29
the aid—term variable in our regression. That is, the voters are not
interested in a balanced Senate per se, but in a balanced executive—
legislative package
5.Conclusion
This paper has developed a general nodal based on the noricn that voters
n Senateelections take account cithe existence of the non—running Senator
whendecidinghow to case their votes. Under several different assumptions
regardingthe candidate objective functions, the model predicts an "opposite
partyadvantage:" Republican Senate candidates are somewhat advantaged when
the non—running Senator is a Democrat, and vice—veras. This result is
generally stronger the greater the influence of the non—running Senator
relative to that of the one who will be chosen in the currant election.
Somewhat lessrobustbut still rather pervasive is an "extrcmes permit
extremeC result: the more extreme the position of the non—running Senator,
themore extreme can be the position of the candidate of the oppusing party.
Thereason i5 that the basic logic of the model is one of balancing. Ii an
ideologue somehow wins election, moderate voters can only counter—balance her
positions by choosing an opposite ideologue. It seems possible that in a
dynamic extension of our models, the extremes permit extremes feature could
give rise to a polarization process that would see a state's Senate candidates
grow increasingly distant over time. We grant that the modelsdiscussed make
heavier informational demands on voters than most political scientists would
find plausible. But the voters need not know the specifics of the candidates'
stands; rather, they need only have an impression of the position of the
candidates relative to each other and to the non—running Senator. At any30
rate, the empirical analysis produces results of a qualified positive nature.
Ar leaat in presidential elections, incumbents of one parry suffer a vote
penalty if the non—running Senatot is of the sese party. Given that half of
all Senate elections occur in presidential years, and about three—quarters ef
incumbents seek re—election, about 40 percent of conresporary Senate elections
fall into this category. Whatever the desands our model makes on voters, it
is the only one of whIch we are aware char can account for this new finding.
Finally, we emphasize that although balancing behavior adds en
interesting twist to parry fortunes in Senate elections, it is certainly nor
the major determinant. It is still better to be an incumbent, to have a
healthy economy (if your parry's president is in office, a poor economy
otherwise), and to have a strong parry base in your stare. Moreover, our
equations explain just a bit more than half the variance in post—war Senate
elections, consistent with exisring characterizations that emphasize their
volatility and unpredicceblliry. Despite their noisy quality end the larger
forces that are at work in Senate elections, however, at the margins small
movements of votes can derermine who wins end who loses. Salancing behavior
may well underlie such movements.Fcc too tes
1. The University of Nebraske sponsored a conference on the study of the
Senate in October 1988, and Rice University and the University of Nooston co-
sponsored e conference on Senate elections in November 1990. In additioo, the
AmericanNationsl Election Studies (ANES) has recently comploted the seoood
wave ofa projected three—weve study.
2, In the five elections of the 1980s, 95 percent of all Noose iooorobents who
sought re—election were successful; the comparable figure for the Senate was
80 percent.
3. Election surveys show that many more voters can place the Senate
csndid.ates on seven—point scales than can place the Nouse candidates. And in
1980 the negative campaigns of conservative groups and RAGS were viewed by
many as the key to che Republican upsets. On the other hand, the Senate
electoral landscape abounds with examples of Senators attackod for boing cot
of touch with their states because of their national activities.
4. In the 1988 Senate elections, 78% of all votes cast weto consistoot wfth
the party identification of the voter, about the same as the figure for Nonse
elections (79%).
5. The answer is not the easy one —therise of two—patty competition in the
South. chile there is a rise in split representation in the Southern states,
it accounts for less than half the trend identified in Ffgure 1.
6.Figure 2 was computed from the first dimension of the D—NONINATE scaling
with linear trend in legislator positions. For detaila on the scaling
procedure, see Poole end Rosenthal (1991;. Ubile the distanoe between32
Senators of different parties is declining over rime, the distance between
Senators of the same party is also declining over time. In fact, the ratio of
the first curve (Senators ef different patties) and the avetage of the latter
two (Senators of the same patty) shows an incteasing ttend. At any tate, what
is most relevent for out model is the dispersion of Senators' position
relative to the distribution of voters' preferences; thete is no reason why
the latter should be constant over time. Thus, one csnnot say for certain how
changes in the distance between the Senators compete to changes in the
distribution of voters' preferences.
7. There is evidence, although it is disputed (for a survey see Brady, Btody
and Fetejohn, (1989) that Senators move toward the center as their election
draws near. Even if true, that does nor alter the fact that they remain
relatively distant from each other.
8. Using the new available 1988 Ametican National Election Studies Senate
data, Erikson (1989) shows that the distributions of Deooctat and Republican
Senate candidates (as viewed by the relevant state electorates) do not
overlsp. That is, the most conservative Southern Deacctat is seen as to the
left of the most liberal Eastern Republican.
9. with one exception: The identical insight has been explofted by Michael
Krassa (1989). The idea is a natural extension of the aodels of President—
House voting developed in Fiorina (1988) and Alesina and Rosenthal (1989a,b)
10, On rare occasions an incumbent dies or recites and the election to fill
the vacant meet occurs at the saae time as the regular election for the other
seat. By our count this has happened only 14 tiaes in tore than 725 Senate
contests since 1946, so we will ignore that possibility in what follows.33
11. It should be noted that in our model balancing occurs within each state.
Thus, the opposite patty advantage refers to each state race viewed
separately, This, of course, sterns from our model of voter's preferences.
embodied in (1). More generally, voters may want to balance, with their vote,
the Senate as a whole. In this case, the "opposite party advantage" would ha
enjoyed by, say a Republican candidate running when the majority of the
Senate is Democratic, in the empirical part of the paper we will test (see
below) whether balancing occurs at the state level or at the level of the
Senate as a whole.
12. Two senators of the same party are always elected if both parties (ecd
the anchor) are on the same side of the median,
13. An additional case is one in which one of the two candidates is an
incumbent which is senior even to the anchor. Derails of this case are
available fram the authors.
14. Without this uncertainty the model would be trivial since for any
combination of polity positions the electoral result would be perfectly
predictable. in such a model, even ideological candidates would fully
converge [Calvert (1985)].
15. See Alesina and Rosenthal (l989a,b) for an identical formalimarion of
uncertainty about voters' preferences.
16 ______ If S0holds, the second order condition of this problem is
satisfied. Henceforth, we assume that this sufficient condition i5satisfied.
17.See note 14.
18. See note 14.34
19. In a dyrtamic model this condition may suggest thrt there is a limit to
the "dynamic polarization trend."
20. Additionally, in the case where parties have fixed positions (because nf
reputational or other considerations), the hypothesis evidently would not
hold.
21, It is easy enough to scale the roll call votes of sitting Senators,
though not all critics would be convinced that problems of measurement
equivalence over time can be overcome. Unfortunately, ascribing positions to
defeated challengers and state electorates is mote difficult, though Wright
and Serkman (1986) point out that this Information is available for 1982 at
least.
22. Given the nature of the hypothesis being tested we naturally had to omit
the elections in which special Senate elections occurred at the same time as
the regular election. Additionally, we eliminated those races in which third
parties got more than 10 percent of the vote, and races in which the losing
candidate got less than 15 percent. Cumulatively, these decision left us with
a total of 458 obserzations, but only fifty from the stares of the old
Confederacy.
23. We estimated models that allowed each state to have a different intercept
(that is, "normal vote"). For such "fixed effects" models it is well known
that OLS provides consistent estimates of the other linear parameters but
inconsistent estimates of the error variance and the intercepts. Since our
interest is in the linear parameters for the independent variables, the
inconsistency problem is not a concern except insofar as the biased error
variance affects significance tests. Since the bias is on the order of l/T,
where T is the number of observations per state, the bias is not a seriousproblem, given that we average 11 observations per srere. In standard
fixed—effeots models there would be an identjoal number of times—series
observations for eaoh state. As this is nor true in our oase (beoause of
omitted eleotions (see previous footnote) we wrote a GAUSS program (available
on request) that estimates the model for varying numbers •of observations.
24. We exsmined a number of measures of national eoonomio oonditjeus as well
as state real inoome figures generously provided by John Chubb. CUP growth
gives the strongest results.
25. Neither measure of the presidential vote (netional, state) was ever
signifioant when CUP was in the equations. Seniority did not improve the fit
of the equations beyond the simple dummy variable for inoumbenoy. We tan the
equations with and without a trend term; though signifioant, exoluding It has
no effeot on other ooeffitients.
26, There is another justification for a linear speoifioation. In the
generalized version of the model (appendix), the magnitude of the opposite
patty effett varies directly with the power" or influenoe of the anohot
Senator. If we take the latters electoral margins, or mandates, as one
element of their 'power," then the strength of the opposite patty advantage
should very directly with the wote margin of the anchor Senator. Thus, there
is substant!ve, as well as statistical justification for intluding the aotuai
magnitude of the anchor vote.
27. The suxary statistics indioste that we csn rejeot the hypothesis that
the coefficients are identical in the two types of eleotiens (p < .03). We
also estimated the effects of other variables seperately mt the two types of
elections but found no significant differences.36
28. Given suggestions in the Gongressionsi litersture sbout important changes
in House elections during the mid—1960s, we also tried estimating separate
coefficients for pre—1966 and post—1966 races. No significant differences
emerged.
29. Note that the effects of previous elections for the some sest ste
pisusible. The relstionship is much stronger when incumbents run than when
they do not. The re1ationshp is again stronger in presidential years than in
off—years.
3G. Returns from the l9SGs did not pool with those from the 19]Gs, consistent
with the mid—1960s trsnsformation in House elections. We did not include
elections from the 196Gm because of the extensive redistricting that took
place in the middle of thst decade. The same 85% cut—off was used as in the
Senste analysis (footnote 19).References
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Appendix
In the text we assumed that the anchor and the new senator weigh equally
in policymaking. In this appendix we derive the results for a more general
formulation of the problem in which these weights are allowed to differ.
Specifically, we assume that the new senator will he junior relative to the
anchor; thus! the former has a weight of q ￿ 1/2 in policy forrnaton while the
latter has a weight (l—q) ￿ 1/2. In this situation, voter i's utility
function, rather than equation (1) would be given by:
(qn +(l-q)a—i)2 (A—I)
The extension of the fixed position case to a generic value of q is
straightforward and is left to the reader. For the case of mobile candidates,
we first note that equation (7), for the probability of a d victory, has to be
replaced by:
prob {d wins] —F(q4—+ (l—q)a —) (A—2)
Condition (8) still holds; it is, in fact, strengthened if q < 1/2.
3d 1) Dertvatron of —forcase 2,
Sa
Assume that, in equilibrium, r < d. The first order condition (17) can
be rewritten as an implicit function:42
H(d,r,a) - [K—(d-d)2[—2P()(d-d)-0 (A-3)
The implicit function theorem implies that:
—— (A—4)
Ba BIT/3d
Applying the implicit function theorem to (A—I) one obtains:




The second order condition (see footnote (14)) implies that the denominator of




Asemphasized in the text, condition (A—i) is satisfied n the case oi a
uniform distribution of w. Consider instead the case in which w has a
unimodal and symmetric distribution. Then, to the right of the mode F"() < 0
andto the left F"(') >0. From (7), since r and a are fixed positions on the
right of 1/2, in equilibrium, for sufficiently large K, f() x1/2.In
2
this case F"() s0and k_2_￿0 so that (A—i) is satisfied.
cd3a43
2) Datvatjon of (18)
Using (4—2) it is immediate to show that:
-F'()(l-q) (4-7)
F'S (4—8) 2
Using (A—7) and (A—f), it follows that:
¶11F'[(l—q) (4—9)
Thus, dP/da > 0 if and only if:
> — (4—10) q
Finally, note that:
(4_il' Dd21—q 8a
Substituting (A—f) into (A—l0), the lattet can be rearranged as follows:44
____- (d-d)2]-2fi[d-d) 2(l-q)
C (A—l2)







Assuming the sufficient second order condition of footnote 14, then the right
hsnd side of (A—13) is negative. As long as the cross partial derivative in
the left hand side is not too high (in ahsolute value), (A—l3) is satisfied.
Thus, conditions (A—f) and (4—13) are jointly satisfied in the case of a
uniform distribution of w; or in the case of a symmetric unimodal distribution
of w as long as, in equilibrium, the election is sufficiently close, that is
P() is sufficiently close to 1/2.
3) Derivation of (23)
Problem (21) is analogous to the model analyzed in Calvert (1985) and
Alesina (1988). Result (23) follows directly from those papers.
4) Derivation of (25)
Assume that, in equilibrium, d Cr.For a general valoe of q, we define
d —h.__3_1-_1?!Using this expression, the generalized version of the first—45
order oondiron (22) Os be written as an implicit function H():
H(d,r,a) ]q2LU+K]P(')2q2(d —d)0 (Ai4)
where LU iS defined in the text.
H ]q2LU+K]42(d—d) P()2q2<0
Condition (A—if) represents the aeoond order condition of this prohie:s, which
hss to be satisfied to guarantee that the solution is a isaxiauss
32P(•)q2+K]+2q(l—q)(r—d)
—2q2L'(d_d) —2q(i_q)p(#)(It—SE)
Thus, it followsthat fd/3a <0ifandonly if3M/as<0,which hoidc ifand
onlyif:
2q¶.1(d-a) +2q(l-q)P(.) — 2q(1_q)2LL(r_d)
(A-IS) a
qAU+K
Onceagain, this condition is satisfied in rhe uniform case. In fact, if
3P/3dôs O, (A—i7) holds if A > 0. The dencminaror of A is positive. The




Thus, as long as d is sufficiently close to r, (A—l8) is satisfied.
5) Derivation of (18) for case 3
Following the sane steps as for Case 2, one can show that for case 3 (18)
holds if:
32() 2 SP(') 2 aF()
-
[qaU +K]+2(l—q)----—--(r--d)—2q—(d—d) —2q(l—q)P()
BdSa Sd < kCS.L (A—19)
SCfq2Au + K] —4q2(d—d) —2q2P(')
Consider, for simplicity, the unifora case, so that 325/BdSa —0.
After rearranging, (A—9) reduces to
q3 q(t-d) > 2(l-q)']q20U + K] —2q3(d-d) —2q2(1-q)P()(A-20)
AssumIng that 8P()/3d2 ￿ 0 which is a sufficient second order condItion,
(A—20) i5 always satisfied because the left band side is non negative and the
right hand side is strictly negative. Thus, as long as the cross partial
32P( )
SdSa
is not too large In absolute value (see above for discussion), then
dP(')/da > 0.47
6) Open seat competition
Consider the situation in whioh both candidate d and r are mobile since
neither of them is the inoumbenr. Oiven the reeults by Wirtman (1963) and
Calvert (1985), Cases 1 and 2 oan be easily analyzed. It is immediate to shcw
thatin both oases, in equilibrium one obtains:
d<d￿r<
(0—21)
The compatativestatios results discussed above iot these two cases
easily generalize. Some interesting issues arise in Case 3. For this case
the problem beoomes:
Max P(')](r-a)2 -(d-d)2+K] (0-22) d
Max (I -P()](d—?)2(r-)2 +K] (0-23) r
- — 1l—o)a
. wherer .Alsowe assume that the benefits oi botng tn oiitca (K) q
of being in offioe (K) is the same for both parties. We also needan
additional suffioient condition for the second order condition, i.e.,
82P(.)/8r2 >0.
Problem (A—22) and (A—23) is identical to the model analyzed by Wittman
(1983) and Calvert (1985) i d and iareinterpreted as the original ideal
points of the two candidates in a model without an anchor. Define a0andi°
asthe solution of that problem, i.e., of (A—22) and (0—23) inrerprctcdas a
Wittman/Calvert problem with nc anchor. Define d* and r the solution of (A—48
22) and (A—23) with the interpretation of the preaent paper. The two
aolutiona differ beoause in our model P(S) is defined in (7), while in a
Witrman/Calvert model we would have P F(h —1/2).
The following results hold:





Thus, the solution to our ptoblem io a linear transformation of the Wittman/
Calvertsolution, identical to the linear rtansforaatlun applied to the
candidates' bliss points. The basic intuition is rhac the presence of the
anchortransforms the utility function of both the candidates and the voters
identically. Simple algebra implies the following results:
1) if a> r° then d* <d°;r* C r°. That is if the anchor is 'far right'
(mote tight than the Wittman/Calvett position), then both positions (d* and
r*) mova to the left relative co d° and r°;
2) symmetric results hold if a Cd°;
3) if tha anchor is 'moderare, i.e., d° ￿ a r°, then fSdoand
m°, with strict inequalities if a is scrsccly iccludcd in (d°,r°). That











Vote %: 0.266 ' 0.343
Same Seat (.035) all (0.060) incumbents
aeats running
Vote %': —.033 —0.075
Anchor Seat (.041) (0.043)
Vote %: — 0.134
Same Seat (0.070) open
a eats
Vote 8: — 0.135
j Anchor Seat (0.071)











Same Seat (0.070) on—years,
incumbents
Vote %: —0.177 running
Anchor Seat (0.056)
Vote %: 0.200
Same Seat (0.098) on—yeatS.
open
Vote %; 0.092 seats
Anchor Seat (0.098)
Vote %: 0.274







Same Seat (0.088) midterms
open
Vote %: 0.170 seats
Anchor Seat (0.091)
R2 0,56
*The dependent variable is the Republican shareof thetwo party vote,
Standarderrors are in parentheses.Table 2
Lag Structure in House Eiect6ons: 1980, 1978, 1976.*
Dep. Variable: VR All Incumbent Open
.87 .96 .34
(0.029) (0,029) (0.085)
3R4 .02 .01 .13
(0.029) (0.029) (0.093)
n 885 773 103
.69 .76 .35
Presidential Years Midterm Year
(19761980) (1978)
Incumbent Open Incumbent Open
.97 .47 .91
(0.034) (0.113) (0.063) 10.135)
VRt4 —.02 —.01 .10 .56
(0.033) (0.120) (0.067) (0,153)
n 524 69 249 34
.76 .33 .76 .49
*Ccnstants are not reported but were included in the regressions. n is the
number of observation of each regression. YR is the Republican share of the
twoparty votes, Standard errors are in parentheses.Table 3
Lag Structure in Senate Elections: 1976, 78, 80*
Dependent Variable: VR All IcthflbEtS









* Theopen seat results are not presented due to the lack of degrees of
freedom for this regression.